New Risks Ahead:The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone by Michael Bolle et al.
The research project ”EZONEPLUS - The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone”, supported by the European 














New Risks Ahead: 
The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone 
 


















New Risks Ahead: 
The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone 
 
Michael Bolle




Eastward enlargement is one of the hot topics in European economics. The accession 
of central and eastern European Countries (CEEC) into the European Union (EU) is 
accompanied by an extension of the eurozone to this region. This paper surveys likely 
outcomes and challenges of this specific feature of EU enlargement. Moreover, the ar-
ticle represents the start of an international research project dealing with these ques-
tions. 
Research is structured along different markets. Hence, the impact of an adoption of the 
euro is analysed for capital and labour markets as well as with respect to exchange rate 
and monetary policies. Our main position is that the euro has in general beneficiary ef-
fects for the CEEC and the current EU in all examined markets. However, these bene-
fits evolve mainly in the long run, whereas the short-term costs of adaptation to the 
new situation may be high. Although we believe that the present value of long-term 
benefits exceeds these costs, it is by no means clear that policy-makers will share this 
view. Due to the usual political-economy transformation, the assessment of costs and 
benefits may be different for politicians than compared to any overall perspective. If of-
ficial policies become unforeseeable, so will private behaviour. International investors 
may reverse their capital flows, draining precious liquidity, and leading to currency and 
financial crises whenever they perceive the authorities’ commitment to EMU less credi-
ble.  
This article highlights some thinkable mechanisms how any such crisis could evolve. It, 
thus, sets the agenda for further research, mainly, with the focus on appropriate policy 
strategies to keep adaptation costs as low as possible, minimise other external risks, 
without hampering the long-term benefits. 
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As it seems, the enlargement process of the 
European Union (EU) has become irreversible. 
Thus, three or four years down the road the 
first Central and East European Countries 
(CEEC) of the former socialist bloc will become 
members of the European Union. There can be 
no doubt that the accession process will shape 
policies and markets, of both current and pro-
spective members. Additionally, e xpansion 
eastward will have numerous implications for 
the distribution of political and economic weight 
within the European Union. A djustment to the 
new conditions will change the traditional flow 
of goods, services, capital and people and 
provide a new set of incentives for economic 
activity.  
Eastward enlargement comes at a time when 
the eurozone struggles with the introduction of 
the euro. It can be argued that the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) is changing the charac-
ter of the European Union in a fundamental 
way because the eurozone member countries 
(currently twelve out of fifteen EU members) 
have agreed to permanently abstain from n a-
tional economic policy instruments such as 
monetary and e xchange rate policies and to 
accept the European Central Bank (ECB) as 
the decision making body to determine interest 
rates and money supply. It goes without saying 
that such an institution is not able to fine-tune 
its decisions in order to meet particular eco-
nomic challenges in specific member coun-
tries. The existence of varying inflation rates in 
different member countries and the determina-
tion of one single interest rate by the ECB may 
create disruptive responses. In this respect, 
the eurozone is likely to be confronted with 
difficult a djustment processes in the future, the 
more so when recession f ears will induce n a-
tional policy makers to guarantee their re-
election by deliberately violating agreed-upon 
rules. 
Once the accession of CEEC to the EU has 
begun, the eastward enlargement of the euro-
zone will be only a couple of more years away. 
After all, it has been one of the 1993 Copen-
hagen EU-accession criteria ”to take on the 
obligations of membership, including (...) the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)”. In fact, 
some CEEC politicians and economists have 
even been toying with the idea of introducing 
the euro unilaterally because the stability crite-
ria have been grossly met and because they 
want to speed up the accession process. 
Membership of accession countries in the e u-
rozone, however, may cause additional risks 
both for the CEEC and for the EMU itself. First 
of all, these countries have to face all the con-
sequences the current eurozone members 
already bear. But, in addition and in contrast to 
those already part of the EMU, applicants from 
the CEEC must cope with the fact that they 
have to continue their transformation efforts 
towards market economies and that their pro-
ductivity and income will remain long-term way 
below the average level of the current euro-
zone, even below the position of countries 
such as Portugal and Greece which currently 
bring up the rear. 
With this background, the objectives of this 
paper are to give an overview of how policies 
and markets are shaped by the prospective 
enlargement of the eurozone with the CEEC. It 
will be shown that their renunciation of mone-
tary sovereignty w ill give the process of Euro-
pean integration a substantial new quality in 
risks. This contribution examines the prospec-
tive risks involved in two steps. In the first sec-
tion, three different channels of risks will be 
discussed in order to sensitise for impacts of 




kets in the CEEC during their integration into 
the European Monetary Union. First, we dis-
cuss the challenges to eastern European capi-
tal markets in transition with regard to trade-
related and FDI-issues, e specially the need to 
finance economic development as reflected by 
increased current account deficits. Second, we 
analyse the consequences for labour markets 
and possible impacts for social and welfare 
regimes. Third, we look at risks that will be 
transmitted via monetary policies. Closely r e-
lated to the above-mentioned channels of risk, 
monetary and exchange rate policies will be of 
major interest (when capital mobility is high, 
exchange rate policy is essentially monetary 
policy). Due to the expected Balassa-
Samuelson-effect, causing real a ppreciation 
tendencies in the CEEC in the m edium term, 
the r enunciation of monetary sovereignty may 
trigger high costs, urging the CEEC to dis-
inflate their economies. The last section, f i-
nally, indicates possible implications for risk 
assessment based on the conclusions of our 
analysis. Eventually, for i nstance, minimising 
risks could encompass a revision of the EMU-
criteria laid out in the Maastricht treaty, in order 
to adequately cope with the special needs of  
CEEC.  
Capital markets and financial flows 
The financial landscape in applicant states will 
be most prominently a ffected by the euro. 
Capital markets in these countries have i m-
proved tremendously over the past decade. 
The 1999 transition indicators of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and D evelopment 
(EBRD) show good grades for the progressive 
applicant states on most financial i ssues. In 
fields such as banking reform, commercial law, 
and financial regulation these countries usually 
achieve grades above 3 ( on a scale from 1 to 
4+) and consequently, these areas are not at 
the top of the agenda for further reform.
1 How-
ever, the development level of mature econo-
mies is still far from being reached. 
A second glance reveals fundamental prob-
lems. One crucial dimension for the functioning 
of capital markets is their institutional frame-
work in which financial transactions are e m-
bedded. This framework is still in the process 
of being defined.
2 It is important to note that 
the EBRD differentiates between extensive-
ness  and effectiveness according to the r e-
spective indicators; extensiveness is usually 
ranked 0 to 3 notches higher than effective-
ness,
3 indicating that there is still room for insti-
tutional arbitrage. Moreover, there is consider-
able evidence that asymmetric i nformation is 
an important shortcoming in most financial 
systems of EU applicants: Although interest 
rate spreads lie between 5.8 (Poland) and 3.1 
(Hungary) percentage points, i.e., well below 
Germany’s of 6.4 (but higher than the 2.7 
spread in the US), domestic bank credit 
amounts to only 35 (Estonia) up to 63 (Czech 
Republic) percent of GDP, compared to 145 in 
Germany and even 164 in the US.
4 Lower 
prices together with lower quantities traded can 
be interpreted here as credit rationing which is 
a standard reaction of business parties to mar-
kets with asymmetric information.
5 This view is 
supported by the fact that barter and other 
non-monetary transactions are far from negli-
gible even in the advanced transition countries. 
Between 11 (Hungary) and 86 percent (Slove-
nia) of firms engage more or less regularly in 
these trades, indicating that demand for financ-
ing exceeds supply.
6  
The apparent shortcomings in the a ccession 
states’ financial sector, especially with regard 
to the institutional framework, have two  major 




potential to precipitate capital market develop-
ment, whereas on the other hand, this leap 
forward may easily fail and inflict tremendous 
cost on these countries.  
A major source of risk is the dependency  on 
capital inflows, which are needed to level with 
mature economies’ capital e ndowment. Gross 
capital formation in the applicant states 
amounts to 25  – 29 percent of GDP, which is 
higher than the usual low twenties figures of 
mature economies but less than the 30 percent 
prevalent in East Asia.
7 The high investment 
quotas indicate a closing of the gap with West-
ern countries, however, as they are largely 
financed by foreign capital inflows, they also 
represent considerable risk.  
The 5 to 7 percent of GDP of net foreign capi-
tal inflows are fuelled by the expectation of 
improving economic and political conditions 
and are guaranteed by accession to the Euro-
pean Union, albeit a ctual economic conditions 
might not justify them. Today, candidates 
benefit enormously from these net inflows for a 
number of reasons: (1) capital market devel-
opment is precipitated because foreign actors 
appear, who are able and willing to take over 
important monitoring and governance func-
tions, (2) capital e ndowment can be increased 
without stressing too much domestic savings 
quotas or the domestic financial system’s abil-
ity to raise funds, (3) the accompanying current 
account deficit does not play a significant role, 
as overall d emand should not be a problem in 
a transition country with i ts need to make up 
for the shortage in consumption, and (4) b e-
cause most of the capital inflows come in the 
form of foreign direct i nvestments, not only 
financing is imported, but also foreign compe-
tence, know-how, and competition, which 
should improve product market’s efficiency. 
However, these capital inflows still come at a 
price. 
Indeed, huge capital inflows spurred by the 
belief in a splendid economic future and a vola-
tile financial world may r esemble the advent of 
the East Asian turmoil four years ago. What, 
one may ask, will happen if expectations of 
future economic improvements are built on 
sand? Can East Asia be a blueprint for a 
worst-case scenario in Eastern Europe? In 
1997, the sudden devaluation of the Thai baht 
led to an unexpected, though not  unprece-
dented, reversal of capital flows in a magni-
tude, which has brought down the whole r e-
gion. What if markets lose faith in a quick ac-
cession of applicant countries to the eurozone, 
or even to the EU? Missing the 2004 deadline 
of the Gothenburg summit could be a plausible 
trigger. What if entering the eurozone does not 
yield the benefits hoped for? It may b ecome 
clear that merely overtaking of the euro does 
not promote good governance to the e xpected 
extent, and thus, market imperfection will per-
sist with investments becoming less attractive. 
What happens once the trigger is pulled is well 
known from previous crises: The loss of capital 
inflows threaten to imbalance the balance of 
payments, and hence, demands d epreciation 
of the local currency in order t o r educe trade 
deficits. The depreciation, however, devalues 
asset prices such as equity shares. Even if 
depreciation can be fought off, rising interest 
rates would harm assets to a similar extent. 
Investors will try to avoid losses in their stakes 
and withdraw further funds from that currency 
thereby precipitating the downward spiral of 
depreciation. What else happens d epends on 
local circumstances. If large amounts of credit 
are d enominated in foreign currency a financial 
and banking crisis will be likely.
8 Anyway, as 




served basis, such a crisis resembles the 
standard multiple equilibria model.
9 The only 
necessary condition for a crisis to happen is 
when the country or region is in a zone of gen-
eral vulnerability.  
Prospective members of the eurozone will 
enter at least one dangerous transition period: 
the time between EU accession and admit-
tance to the eurozone. Then, early benefits will 
be expected and initial disappointments may 
appear. Moreover, any delay in enlarging the 
eurozone will then become o bvious and may 
trigger the crisis. Even if a reversal of financial 
flows does not immediately lead to crisis, a p-
plicant states would forgo benefits (1), (2), and 
(4).  Moreover, the then rising need to reduce the 
trade deficit will most likely result in a reduction of 
overall demand and thus harm economic growth.  
 
Labour markets and the social dimension 
Whatever affects employment and s ocial well 
being must be of special interest to policy-
makers because it influences their chances of 
re-election. Unemployment rates in the pro-
gressive applicant states are b etween 4.7 
(Czech Republic) and 10.5 (Poland) percent. 
These rates are still too high, with the probable 
exception of the Czech Republic; however, 
compared to western European standards they 
do not seem excessive. Moreover, social c o-
hesion seems not to be endangered as is 
shown with indicators such as the Gini-
coefficient, which has values of 24 (Hungary) 
up to 38 (Estonia). In most accession countries 
Gini-coefficients are around the 30 of Germany 
and none exceed the 40 of the US.
10 Thus, 
unequal income distribution does not seem to 
be a likely source of social conflict in the near 
future.  
However, the devil lies in the detail. A lthough 
unemployment rates might not be excessive, 
the high ratio of long-term unemployment (be-
tween 30 and 51 percent of total unemploy-
ment) is disturbing. This high share indicates 
rigid labour markets, which may be the conse-
quence of the communist employment system, 
but constitutes the potential for future prob-
lems. Accession to the eurozone will lead to 
the constraint of d omestic economic policy. 
Neither fiscal nor monetary policies will have 
the potential to accommodate real economic 
shocks, which raises the usual concerns in 
regard  to optimum currency areas. CEEC pro-
duction structure differs widely from those of 
existing EU-members in many r espects: lower 
capital endowment, lower productivity, higher 
share of agricultural production, etc. Due to 
these differences, applicant states are much 
likelier to be subject to adverse asymmetric 
shocks, and because of the little economic 
weight these countries will have in euroland, 
the chance is less that the European Central 
Bank might comfort such shocks by relaxing 
monetary policy. Other remedies are migration, 
which obviously will not be tolerated especially 
by neighbouring countries such as Austria or 
Germany, and deregulation of labour markets. 
Market participants will adapt to changing mar-
ket conditions, as long as these alterations are 
credible. The constraints enforced by the euro, 
i.e., criteria of Maastricht and the Stability Pact, 
are much more precise than the mere obliga-
tion to sound economic policies demanded by 
the  acquis communautaire. Moreover, old 
members of the EU might accept  deviation 
from the consensus of good economic policies 
in the then new member states as long as they 
do not belong to the eurozone, for political 
reasons or in order to allow for a short-term 
facilitation of the still ongoing transition proc-
ess. As soon as the euro will be adopted by 




less likely to tolerate unsound economics b e-
cause they would affect their own welfare 
through at least two channels: (1) Expansion-
ary fiscal and monetary policies would increase 
inflationary pressures which have to be borne 
by all euroland members via rising interest 
rates. Note, that the magnitude of this channel 
is rather limited due to the small economic 
weight the CEEC will have within euroland. (2) 
Allowing any new member to violate criteria of 
Maastricht or Stability Pact could serve as bad 
example for others and will thus be avoided. 
Hence, with the arrival of the euro, economic 
constraints for applicant CEEC must be pre-
sumed to be much more binding.  
Boundaries in economic discretion will shape 
labour markets by changing the behaviour of 
relevant actors. First of all, there are the con-
tract partners, unions and business associa-
tions, which determine wages and labour con-
ditions. With no accommodating monetary or 
fiscal policy in sight, it will be more and more 
necessary to resist the urge for higher wages 
and premium conditions. This is a learning 
process that is already visible, for instance, in 
the moderate wage increases in current euro-
zone members.  
More flexible labour markets are beneficiary for 
long-term economic performance. In the short 
term they may be costly in economic and p o-
litical terms, which is even reinforced by the 
special circumstances of transition. A likely 
scenario is that high skilled labour in modern, 
export-orientated sectors of the economy will 
benefit from more flexible labour markets in the 
form of higher wages and improved working 
conditions, whereas the rest of the workforce 
will suffer from deteriorating circumstances. 
Such wage differentials are aggravated in the 
CEEC because of the high share of employ-
ment in agriculture and the public sector, which 
are characterised by low productivity, and 
hence, will only experience mediocre devel-
opment. The same holds for the large part of 
publicly controlled and owned enterprises, 
which, as a consequence of the socialist leg-
acy, exhibit a too high employment per output 
and only few growth options. The aforemen-
tioned large share of long-term unemployment 
shows the difficulty of integrating workers from 
communist-style f irms into modern employ-
ment. Outsiders of the prospering parts of the 
economy do also include people who have 
retreated from the labour market, such as pen-
sioners.  
Thus, liberalisation of labour markets will i n-
duce an insider-outsider problem, where insid-
ers may reap most of the benefits and outsider 
bear most of the social costs. Improved welfare 
throughout the population and a vanishing 
border between insiders and outsiders is only 
possible in the long run. 
CEEC governments are then between a rock 
and a  hard place. Deregulation of labour mar-
kets will lead to social costs and might, endan-
ger re-election, especially as outsiders like 
pensioners and public employees traditionally 
exhibit a very strong political lobby. With fewer 
economic tools at their disposal, adverse eco-
nomic shocks can only be absorbed via flexible 
labour markets or will lead to unemployment 
and a shrinking economy. Although it seems 
quite obvious that the first option is favourable, 
because of its positive long-term perspective, it 
is by no means clear that this option will be 
chosen in the CEEC. The reason is that those 
who suffer from a shrinking economy in the 
second case may be politically less influential 
and are thus easier to discriminate against. 
 




Monetary and exchange-rate policies 
The way in which monetary and r espectively 
exchange rate policies are affected by the 
prospective accession of the CEEC to EMU, is 
connected with the appearance of the so-
called Balassa-Samuelson-effect. The e x-
pected phenomenon is, first of all, r elated to 
the economies of the CEEC. This is however 
likewise generating a qualitative risk amongst 
current members of EMU. That risk, being a 
negative externality of the economic perform-
ances of the CEEC, may enhance co-operative 
European efforts to internalise expected nega-
tive consequences of a Balassa-Samuelson-
effect. 
The possibility of increasing productivity and 
growth rates in the CEEC due to the prospec-
tive accession to the EMU may create addi-
tional inflationary pressures. The expected 
leaps in productivity are due to the liberalisa-
tion of markets, international trading and inten-
sified competition. Moreover, the productivity 
rates are expected to a ccelerate within the 
CEEC more quickly than outside, i.e. within the 
current members of the EMU, due to the inten-
sifying competition. That effect is accompanied 
as has been shown above by a positive impact 
of net capital inflows on quotas of FDI. How-
ever, i ncreased productivity refers mainly to 
the sector of tradable goods. With the higher 
productivity comes increasing income levels, 
i.e. increasing rates of wages. The rising level 
of wages, however, is not exclusively restricted 
to the sector of tradable goods: The price level 
in the sector of non-tradable goods will i n-
crease too. Because of lacking progress in 
productivity in that sector the higher costs on 
the supply-side, that is the wages, are passed 
on to the consumer-prices. While the inflation 
rates of the CEEC in the sector of tradable 
goods adapt to the respective level in the cur-
rent EU due to competition, it is not necessarily 
valid for the development of the price level 
within the sector of non-tradable goods. 
Thereby, a mark-up in prices for non-tradable 
goods and non-substitutable services in CEEC 
contributes to an increase in the average price 
level. This is essentially the Balassa-
Samuelson-effect, which may cause several 
severe problems for the monetary policies in 
the CEEC. 
The accession candidates will at least have to 
choose their exchange rate regimes twice on 
their path toward the EMU. One of  the Maas-
tricht criteria for monetary convergence is the 
participation in the successor of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2), in the last 
two years without realignment.
11 Members of 
ERM2 may determine the fluctuation band 
from a maximum size of +/– 15 percent to zero 
percent as long as monetary conditions are 
perceived to cope with these targets. The for-
mer choice of an appropriate exchange rate 
regime before entering ERM2 is the more i n-
teresting case regarding the Balassa-
Samuelson-effect. Such an  exchange-rate 
regime has to meet at least two obligations: 
First, net capital i nflows should be stabilised 
and international competition should not be 
worsened. Second, the exchange-rate regime 
has to cope with internal policy objectives (for 
instance employment), too. However, because 
of the Balassa-Samuelson-effect, i.e. the rise 
of the average price level, the currencies of the 
CEEC tend toward a real appreciation in the 
medium term, which will worse their ability to 
compete. Moreover, transition economies have 
a higher potential for quality improvements 
than mature markets. Corresponding higher 
prices are hard to tell apart from nominal i n-
creases, thus, the measured average inflation 
rates may be higher for statistical reasons.




Therefore, the CEEC are b eing urged to dis-
inflate their economies in order to cope with 
their exchange-rate obligations. 
Accordingly, restricted monetary sovereignty 
and the given exchange rate requirements may 
trigger high costs The costs of an ongoing 
disinflation, caused for i nstance by rising u n-
employment rates, may exceed the advan-
tages of fixed exchange-rates. As a conse-
quence such parity may be suspended. Even 
with a most sensibly chosen exchange-rate 
regime a government and respectively central 
bank may be forced to give u p if market senti-
ments turn against them. That is when internal 
and external objectives are considered to be 
too much conflicting.  Consequently, there are 
some distortions in the fundamentals and a 
reversal of capital-flows in the corresponding 
economy. W ith these consequences directly 
affecting a country, such a change in the 
monetary policy and the abandonment of the 
exchange-rate regime has further i mpacts on 
the economic performances of other CEEC 
and current members of the EMU as well. The 
other CEEC  might be affected by trade/ finan-
cial linkages and externalities due to asymmet-
ric information: If market sentiments consider 
all CEEC as one type of economy, the failure 
of one country’s exchange-rate regime will give 
a ”bad signal”, forcing other countries to adjust 
monetary and respectively exchange-rate pol-
icy. That line of argument emphasises the 
possible impact on the current members of 
EMU as well. Eventually, it can be assessed 
that such a negative policy externality of a 
single country’s performance is generating a 
systemic risk, i.e. disrupting the economic and 
political performances of all European coun-
tries. 
However, with regard to the impact on the 
current EMU by the prospective membership of 
the CEEC, another a rgument has to be put in 
place. Since transparency in the decision-
making process of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) is lacking, the ECB could be expected to 
concern itself with the economic performances 
of the CEEC. Markets could expect the mone-
tary policy of the ECB to be more relaxed than 
normally necessary in order to achieve price 
stability – for instance, to improve the ability of 
the CEEC to a ttract capital inflows by lowering 
its interest rates. A ccordingly, the risk-premia 
for EMU would rise and the ECB would actu-
ally have to raise interest rates. All current 
members of the EMU would be worse off. 
Conclusions 
The analyses of the previous sections have 
shown that considerable risk lies ahead on the 
road toward the EMU. Even  small changes in 
expectations, can lead to severe economic 
drawbacks. Eventually, this could trigger a 
financial crisis à la Southeast Asia 1997.  
Moreover, accession to the EMU will i mpose 
numerous constraints on the economic policies 
of candidates and, thereby, enforce market 
adjustment. In the end, these adjustments are 
expected to reshape CEEC markets for the 
good, however, there is still the possibility that 
policy-makers will not allow appropriate market 
adjustment in o rder to maintain their political 
support. The cost would have to be borne by 
those less organised and less able to deal with 
conflict. The overall economic performance 
would be hampered. F inally, the transition to 
the currency regime, monetary union, exhibits 
in itself considerable costs and risks. The 
CEEC, are still transition countries and suffer 
from real sector inefficiencies (e.g. Balassa-
Samuelson), which are likely to lead to real 




disinflation unnecessarily expense for rather 
technical reasons. 
Risks and costs will not be limited to the CEEC 
but will also have repercussions on current 
EMU-members. Hence, it has been argued 
that Maastricht criteria should be supple-
mented by further real convergence indicators, 
taking into account real sector problems. Two 
directions can be distinguished: (1) Those who 
emphasise costs and risks for the current 
EMU-members argue in favour of a criterion 
that requires far-leading real economic conver-
gence, for instance with respect to income-
levels, and hence make accession to the EMU 
harder;
13 (2) those who emphasise adjustment 
costs for the CEEC argue in favour of a relaxa-
tion of Maastricht criteria in order to facilitate 
accession.  
Both arguments are flawed because neither 
take into account the political cost. Although an 
additional indicator for real convergence m ight 
make economic sense, actually choosing one 
is far from trivial. Any country not being permit-
ted access to the EMU, based on this indicator, 
might perceive it to be a political, not eco-
nomic, instrument to justify its exclusion. The 
same holds true for any criterion designed to 
loosen the convergence burden for the CEEC. 
Any deviation from Maastricht-criteria could 
then be excused by the legacy of transition or 
by other Balassa-Samuelson-like factors, giv-
ing the possibility to allow accession d espite 
the violation of Maastricht and without losing 
face. Hence, the urge for good economic poli-
cies would be r educed because adapting the 
indicator instead of reforming policies would be 
an easier way out. The roots of the impractical-
ity of any real convergence  criterion thus lie in 
the absence of any convincing concept of d e-
sign. Although attempts have been made in the 
past, cf. the OCA-indicator of Eichengreen and 
Bayoumi
14 or the convergence indicator of 
Deutsche Bank R esearch,
15 no consensus 
exists in detail on how such an indicator should 
be created. Therefore, any chosen indicator 
would i mmediately be subjected to reflecting 
political bargaining rather than to economic 
reasoning. 
Accession to the EMU offers tremendous 
chances for the most progressive CEEC, which 
can be felt even now. A glance at monetary 
figures reveals the latest progress  – sinking 
inflation, converging interest rates, and improv-
ing financial market conditions  – which is at 
least partly due to generally positive expecta-
tions. However, the ongoing path may prove to 
be too thorny with n umerous roadblocks 
ahead. Some of those have been described in 
this paper, but a great deal of them has not 
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